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October 28, 2007

US: Is The Poll On Foreign Policy Attitudes All It's Cracked up To Be?

High Anxiety?

The latest edition of the "Confidence in U.S. Foreign Policy Index" poll has just been published. This is the fifth of a series of polls produced every six months by Public Agenda, covering "over 25 different issues in more than 110 different survey questions".

The first such study was carried out in June 2005, and if news reports are to be believed, then American public confidence in its government's foreign policy is declining fast. At first reading, the actual document does suggest a drop in "approval" for policies being carried out abroad, and overall cynicism about whether anything positive can be achieved in certain areas. Compared to the first report from 2005, the public appears to becoming less supportive of foreign policies.

The news reports (at least 60 so far) seem gloomy, but one should remember that most of these are all copies of one article at press release.

The press release talks of the "Petraeus effect". On September 11, General David Petraeus, the senior US military commander in Iraq, gave testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee. He had spoken then of the troop "surge" having effect in countering the insurgency and creating more stability. The polling for the "Confidence in U.S. Foreign Policy Index" was carried out between September 17 and September 27.

According to Daniel Yankelovich, chairman of Public Agenda, "The Petraeus report may have slowed the get-out-of-Iraq momentum but overall confidence in our foreign policy is eroding across a wide spectrum of issues. The administration and Congress seem isolated from the public."

The fifth report was authored by Jared Bosk and Amber Ott, and was compiled in conjunction with Foreign Affairs, with support from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and the Ford Foundation.

The press release quotes Gideon Rose, Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs, who states: "The public sees no silver bullets for current problems, and they are correct. But whether that is cause for despair, of course, depends on just how desperate one thinks those problems actually are."

Before I delve into the meat and bones of the report, one thing strikes me in particular. I live in Britain, where we have an estimated population of 60,776,240 people (give or take the odd 500,000 to 800,000 illegal immigrants). As of July 2007, the United States has an estimated population of 301,139,947. Roughly, the U.S. has 4.95 times the numbers of citizens than the United Kingdom.

In Britain, the "safe" number for poll samples - i.e. the number of respondents questioned who are believed to provide a reliable reflection of prevalent public attitudes - is at least 1,000. Usually, polls which are taken seriously in Britain have between 1,000 and 1,400 respondents. I have yet to see a single recently-published "public attitudes" survey in Britain which involves less than 1,000 respondents.

The "Confidence in U.S. Foreign Policy Index" uses a representative sample of only 1,011 adults 18 years and older. If this figure was translated onto the British demographic and statistical expectations, it would be the equivalent of polling only 200 people and would not be considered as having great statistical merit.

The poll includes a "Foreign Policy Anxiety Indicator" - a scale in which public anxiety is presented in a graphical form. On Page 2, the authors state: "Our Anxiety Indicator stands at 136, down one point from six months ago and still uncomfortably close to the 150 mark we would consider a collapse of confidence in the government's foreign policy". Yikes...

This gimmicky graphic reminds me of the "Doomsday" clock presented during the Cold War, which was always stuck at five minutes to midnight and mysteriously disappeared after Perestroika. The Anxiety Indicator is absent from the first report of June 2005. It was also absent from the second report, which was compiled between January 10 and January 22, 2006. The Anxiety Indicator initially appeared in third report of September 2006 (page 4), when it stood at 130. The Anxiety Indicator stood at 137 in March 2007 (page 6). Just like the Doomsday Clock, the Anxiety Indicator seems to be perennially wedged in a position "uncomfortably close" to midnight.

Trends and Figures

Despite my reservations about the size of the report's data set and caution about the reliability of the "Anxiety Index", the survey's findings should still be examined. The people sampled in the survey are described on page 37 as 48% male and 52% female, with 27% being Republican, 32% Democrat, 27% Independent and 10% "something else". 81% were Christian, with 1% Jewish, 1% Muslim, 0% Buddhist, 1% Atheist, 3% Agnostic, 3% "something else". 10% described themselves as having "no religion". The sample was 68% White, 11% Black/Afro-Caribbean, 13% Hispanic, 2% Asian and 5% "something else". Most of the respondents (36%) came from the south.

As described in the "Summary of Findings" (pages 4 to 5) the respondents have since June 2005 developed less confidence in the ability of some policies to enhance U.S. security by a "great deal". Supporting women's rights in Muslim countries to enhance national security has dropped by 14%, while showing more respect for other countries' viewpoints has also declined by 9% and tighter controls on immigration are now seen by 6% less people as likely to improve U.S. security than in 2005.

The report states that "confidence in many strategies is failing, and public approval in almost every policy area has declined". But is this solely a fault of U.S. foreign policy or a pragmatic reflection of a world - particularly in the Middle East and the Muslim world - that has become generally more intransigent and less amenable to U.S. or Western democratic policies?

In the June 2005 report, (page 17) people were asked: "What do you think is the most important problem facing the United States in its dealings with the rest of the world?" 17% answered "the Iraq war" and 11% said "terrorism/security". 9% answered "negative image in the view of foreign nations." The question at that time was open-ended. Since publication of the second report (January 2006) the respondents had to conform to "multiple-choice" answers. When the same question was asked in September 2007 (page 20 of the current document), 39% answered "Middle East", 17% said "Administration/politics", 16% answered "Domestic problems," and 11% answered "Foreign policies".

Looking at previous answers, the Middle East was regarded in September last year by 42% of people to have been the major problem (when people were questioned immediately after the Israel/Lebanon conflict), and 40% this spring. Year on year there has been a progressive rise in people citing domestic problems as the major U.S. problem, from 10% in January 2006 to 16% now. Foreign policies have been seen as the major problem by 11% of the current sample, compared to 8% six months ago, 7% in September 2006 and 8% in January 2006. Despite this, the public perception of "administration/politics" as being "the most important problem" have hardly changed. The figure was 16% in January 2006 and September 2006, and 17% in March 2007 and September 2007.

Question 9 (page 22 of the current report) asked: "How good a job is the U.S. doing these days as a leader in creating a more peaceful and prosperous world?" There were no comparisons from June 2005 and January 2006. Currently, only 5% think the U.S. does an "excellent job", compared to 10% in September 2006. The answer "a good job" came from 20% in this report, compared to 20% six months ago and 21% in September 2006 - so little change there. Now, 32% answered that the U.S. does a "poor job", a drop of 2% from March this year, and a gain of 2% from September 2006. But more people this time around thought the U.S. is doing a "fair job", at 42% of respondents. Six months and a year ago the figure was 39%.

Question 11 (page 25) asked about how much people worried about a range of issues. On the issue of the Iraq war causing too many casualties, 60% of people said they "worried a lot", a drop of 4% from six months ago. In June 2005 and January 2006, that figure was 56%, and in September 2006 it stood at 55%.

The fear that terrorist groups "may use biological, chemical or nuclear weapons to attack the United States" was higher than it had been, with 49% claiming now to "worry a lot", an increase of 4% in the last six months. In June 2005 the figure was 48%, so fears of such terrorism appear to strongly concern almost half of the electorate.

The current report shows that 53% of women worry "a lot" about a WMD terrorist attack, compared to 44% of men, and suggests that women are more fatalistic about the U.S.'s abilities to deal with its problems.

45% of those questioned said in the current report that they worried "a lot" that "it may be too easy for illegal immigrants to come into the country". This figure is the highest it has been since June 2005, when 42% of people felt this way.

41% of people now said they worried "a lot" that "there may be growing hatred of the United States in Muslim countries", a drop by 1% from six months and a year ago, but an increase of 1% from June 2005.

40% of people now said they worried "a lot" that "there may be another major terrorist attack against the United States in the near future", a drop of 2% from six months ago and an increase of 3% since June 2005. The point where most people felt this way (45%) was in September 2006, after the Lebanon/Israel conflict. However, 46% of people say now that they "worry somewhat" about a major terrorist attack, a dramatic increase from 37% six months and a year ago.

40% of people are now worried "a lot" about the "rise of Islamic extremism around the world", the same as six months ago and a dramatic increase of 11% from the 31% who worried "a lot" about this in June 2005.

When the current data was gathered, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the president of Iran, had just visited the United States. 42% of people "worried a lot" about the "possibility of unfriendly nations becoming nuclear powers", an increase of 1% from six months ago and far higher than in June 2005, when only 31% of people were worrying a lot about the issue.

Question 12 asked if people thought that "improved communication and dialogue with the Muslim world will reduce hatred of the United States." Now, as they did six months and a year ago, 53% of people said "yes". This is less than in January 2006 (56%) and less still than in June 2005 (59%). It appears that cynicism about how much improved dialogue can create positive change is increasing. This year and six months ago, 43% of people answered "No". A year ago, 41% said "No" and in January 2006, 37% of people said "No." In June 2005, the figure was 38%.

Interpreting The Data

I do not think the survey involves enough people to cause government policy makers to make any radical rethinking of specific plans. On issues like Iraq, the situation is as it is - the troop surge and a commitment to imposing law and order has been comparatively successful, but any hasty withdrawal in the immediate future will only cause the earlier insurgent-driven chaos to return.

Despite my reservations, there does seem to be coherence among the respondents' answers, with definite trends being manifest over time. I was particularly struck by the way that respondents to the survey seemed to understand foreign policy problems in a realistic and down to earth manner. It could be argued that their approach to these issues seems to be one of almost fatalistic resignation. I would hope that in the next report, the sample base could be increased, to give the findings more political relevance.

The report's summary states (page 5) that "Democrats and Republicans continue to differ greatly on issues of foreign policy - nearly half of Republicans (49%) say U.S. foreign policy is heading in the right direction, compared with only 14 percent of Democrats. Also, 45 percent of Republicans give A or B grades for meeting our objectives in Iraq, compared with only 15 percent of Democrats."

With an election coming up, it would be interesting to see how issues of confidence in foreign policy will be translated into votes, if at all. In the first report from 2005, respondents answered (page 23) very specific questions about how they voted in the last election, questions which were subsequently dropped, or omitted from later publications.

83% of respondents in the 2005 questionnaire had voted in the previous election. More people (32%) thought of themselves as Democrat rather than Republican (27%) or "independent" (31%). When asked how they "leaned", 23% said they leaned to the Republican Party, and 23% said they leaned to the Democratic Party. 53% claimed not to lean either way. Of the 789 individuals who had voted, 50% of respondents had chosen George W. Bush, and 44% had voted for John Kerry.

The authors of the current report acknowledge the American public's pessimism about Iraq, stating that there has been "hardly any change for our other Iraq indicators, with roughly two thirds favoring at least a gradual withdrawal and roughly half saying there's not much the United States can do to create a democratic Iraq or to control the violence there."

Question 14 asked if there were issues that "our government can do a lot about, something about or not much about?" On controlling the violence in Iraq, only 15% said that the U.S. could do "a lot", while 34% said "something" and 49% said "not much".

On preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, 27% answered that there was "a lot" that the United States could do, compared to 35% in January last year. 42% said "something", compared to 44% in early 2006. 30% of people answered "not much", compared to 19% in January 2006.

There was also increased cynicism about America's abilities to help other nations to become democracies. Only 22% thought that this was possible, compared to 38% in June 2005. In the current survey, 73% thought that democracy is "something that countries only come to on their own" compared to 54% in June 2005.

Despite this, there was still some hope for the U.S.'s abilities to establish good relations with moderate Muslims. In this report, 30% thought that "a lot" could be done, compared to 35% in January 2006. 45% this time thought that "something" could be done to this end, while in January 2006, 41% believed this. 23% of people said there was "not much" that the government could do to make good relations with moderate Muslims, compared with 20% who believed this in January last year.

When the next U.S. elections come on November 4, 2008, George W. Bush will not be able to stand as a candidate. The decision to enter Iraq was primarily his personal responsibility. The Democrats have so far offered to the American public no realistic strategy for dealing with the consequences of that decision. Democratic candidates have played on the nation's "war fatigue" in their electoral campaigning to date, but they have offered no practical solutions to the situation in Iraq that radically diverge from those already being pursued by the military.

In the current "Confidence in U.S. Foreign Policy Index", 75% of people questioned stated that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is "very important". On Page 21, people were asked if they thought "the world is becoming safer or more dangerous for the United States and the American people". 45% thought the situation was "much more dangerous" and 34% thought the situation was "somewhat more dangerous".

There will be only one more "Confidence in U.S. Foreign Policy Index" report before the 2008 election. By that time, both main parties will already have their candidates in the field, pressing the flesh and persuading the public of their worth. The public's concerns which seem to be expressed in the current report should be recognized, but issues of tough policy against America's foes should not be traded for capitulation in the war against terrorism.

Perhaps more importantly, on page 7 of the Index report some questions which had "graded" answers were displayed as graphs. In parts of Question 10 (page 22) respondents were asked to grade the United States’ performance in achieving certain goals. On the question of whether the U.S. was achieving the goal of "a strong, well-supplied military", 27% gave an "A" grade and 31% gave a "B" grade. The figure giving an "A" was lower than in previous reports. When A and B grades were combined in the graph on page 7, a clear pattern emerged. Every six months the respondents had decreasingly felt that the U.S. was achieving this goal.

Similarly, when asked to grade the nation’s performance in its goal of "hunting down anti-American terrorists", the current report had showed 12% giving an "A" grade, a decrease from previous reports. 29% had given a "B" grade, an increase on all previous reports apart from June 2005 when 35% had given a "B" grade. When A and B grades were combined, again a gradual decrease was shown in approval of performance.

On the question of the nation’s performance in achieving the goal of "giving the war on terror all the attention it deserves", 22% gave "A" grades (a decrease on previous figures) and 26% gave "B" grades, again a decrease from previous Index reports.

Britain was George W. Bush's staunchest ally when Iraq was invaded on March 19, 2003. Since that time, Tony Blair has been replaced by Gordon Brown who has ordered his ministers not to even mention the "war on terror", in case it upsets Muslim voters. The U.S. public - if this report is to be believed - is still genuinely concerned about terrorism. There are elements in the U.S. establishment who would believe, like Britain, that making moves to pander to the Islamists in the Muslim Brotherhood will be politically beneficial.

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi may have defied government advice back in April and posed in a Damascus market wearing a Muslim headscarf. Steny Hoyer may have met with the parliamentary leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The Nixon Center may have suggested engaging with the Muslim Brotherhood. Such tactics may not cut much ice with the voting public. The successive "Confidence in U.S. Foreign Policy Index" reports have shown that the U.S. public is increasingly losing faith in the notion that improving communications with the Muslim world will make America more liked. Islamists, who oppose even moderate Muslims, will not be changing their policies in a hurry.

However America and its allies may deal with the process of disengagement from Iraq, the threat of international terrorism, coming from key points in the Muslim world, will remain. The American voting public are not fools to be easily emotionally manipulated with promises that a quick departure from Iraq will suddenly make the future rosy. Islamists are set against the core values of America - democracy, personal liberty and the equal rights of women. Their hatred and ultimate strategy of confrontation will not go away merely because a "sympathetic" figure may be elected as President. No-one should forget that it was during a Democratic presidency that Ramzi Yousef attacked the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, or that the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya were bombed on August 7, 1998.

The events of 9/11 were a natural progression of Islamism's existing war against the West, and in particular against America. For Islamic terrorists, whether a Democrat or a Republican sits in the Oval Office is an irrelevance. The president will still be an American. Candidates from both parties should never drop their guard in the war against terror, nor pretend that terrorism will go away if they adopt policies of appeasement to Islamism. This is a war that is not an "invention" of George W. Bush - it is only the latest stage of a battle that has been waged against the West for years. For any potential candidate to ignore this is to invite more atrocities against the American people.

Posted by Giraldus Cambrensis at October 28, 2007 2:48 PM

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