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June 20, 2007

The Islamists' Nuclear Terrorist Threat - 2 of 2

This article by Adrian Morgan (Giraldus Cambrensis of Western Resistance) appeared earlier today in Family Security Matters and is reproduced with their permission.

The Islamists' Nuclear Terrorist Threat

Part Two (of Two)

Radiological Dispersal Devices

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Law Enforcement Conference in Miami last week took place in an appropriate location. The suspected terrorist Jose Padilla is currently on trial in the city. He became the first person to be incarcerated under the terms of the Patriot Act for his alleged attempts to create a "dirty bomb" or RDD. This plot had apparently been hatched in Lahore, Pakistan, in 2001 with Abu Zubadayah, an Al Qaeda member who was arrested in Pakistan in March 2002.

Zubadayah informed FBI operatives that the plot to create a "dirty bomb" or "radiological dispersion device" (RDD) would have involved radioactive materials stolen from within the US. The target of the attack would have been Washington DC. Two months after Zubadayah was apprehended, Padilla was arrested in May 2002 at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport as he arrived in the US. Deapite Zubadayah's testimony, Padilla is not being charged with the plot to create an RDD.

Zubadayah (also spelled "Zubaydah") claimed to his interrogators that Al Qaeda had the "know-how" to create an RDD. He also claimed that Al Qaeda had been plotting an attack upon American banks. That information was treated by US officials with some skepticism, even though it led to an FBI alert. The information Zubadayah gave is now, in the light of the conviction of Dhiren Barot, probably based on accurate sources.

A radiological dispersion device relies upon a radioactive material with a long half-life being combined with conventional explosives. Once the explosives are detonated, the radioactive particles are dispersed into the environment.

Potential radioactive isotopes which could be used in an RDD include the following, accompanied by their half-life duration:
Americium-241 (432.7 years)
Californium-252 (2.6 years)
Cesium-137 (30 years)
Cobalt-60 (5.3 years)
Iridium-192 (74 days)
Plutonium-238 (88 years)
Polonium-210 (140 days)
Radium-226 (1,600 years)
Strontium-90 (29 years)

All of the above, apart from strontium-90 and polonium-210 give out gamma rays, while all except polonium-210 give out beta particles. Americium-241, californium-252, plutonium-238, polonium-210 and radium-226 additionally give out alpha particles.

Alpha particles, which are composed of protons and neutrons, cannot penetrate human skin, but when a radioactive isotope enters the body via inhalation or via a cut (possible in the initial explosion of an RDD) its emission of alpha particles can cause major damage to the functions of cells and thus affect internal organs. When Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned on November 1, 2006 with polonium-210, which only gives out alpha particles, systemic tissue and nerve damage caused him to die within three weeks in acute discomfort.

Beta particles are high energy electrons, which can travel further than alpha particles, being stopped by 10 feet of air, less than two inches of water, or a thin layer of glass or metal. Direct exposure to beta particles can cause burns to the skin, but like alpha particles, beta radiation is dangerous when carried into the body, disrupting cell function. Beta particles' ability to penetrate further into tissue makes the damage they cause to be more severe.

Gamma rays are "quanta" - packets of high energy which can penetrate 13 feet of water, two meters of concrete or one and a quarter feet of lead. These rays can penetrate right through a human body and their physical effects are far more serious. The general effects of radiation poisoning involve "ionizing" of atoms and breaking chemical bonds in molecules. Depending on the doses and duration, cancers can form later in the body. Strontium-90 and radium-226 have chemical similarities to calcium, and can thus collect in bones and teeth and eventually cause bone cancer.

The problems created by a radiological dispersion device are essentially the same as nuclear "fallout" from a fissile device. The initial death toll from an RDD will mainly be caused by the conventional explosives which are used to disperse the radionuclides. Symptoms created by the radiation will appear later, depending on how far people have become exposed.

Al Qaeda has been active in its pursuit of an RDD. In January 2003 British intelligence officials revealed that Osama bin Laden had obtained radionuclides from the Taliban, and had ben developing a dirty bomb in Herat in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda also had produced manuals on how to employ RDDs for maximum effect.

In 2005 an Al Qaeda website presented the details of how to assemble an RDD in the form of an 80-page manual. The Arabic-language website, called Al-Firdaws (Paradise), had received 57,000 hits. It advised readers to seek out radium-226. This substance is not easily available, but in an RDD could render an area unsafe for 1,600 years. John Hassard, reader in physics at Imperial College, London said of the guide: "Normally you just get generic principles, but this appears to be more like a proper instruction manual... A lot of effort has been put into it."

In Canada in 2003 al Qaeda suspect and son of a radical imam Adnan El Shukrijumah was being sought by the CIA and FBI. This man had in the previous year posed as a student at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario. The university has a 5 megawatt nuclear research reactor. With other associates, Guyana-born Shukrijumah had reportedly stolen 180 pounds of nuclear waste from the university. He is still wanted by the FBI and features on the US Rewards for Justice register, where a bounty of up to $5 million rests on his head.

Dhiren Barot was an Indian-born British citizen, who not only planned to attack American banks, but had also developed details plans to detonate a dirty bomb in the US. Barot was arrested in 2004, along with seven individuals who were to act as operatives in his terror cell. Barot himself was sentenced on November 7, 2006 to life imprisonment, to serve a minimum of 40 years in jail. This tariff was later reduced on appeal to 30 years' minimum. On June 15, 2007 the seven members of his cell were jailed for a total time of 136 years.

Barot had devised several attack scenarios, involving gas canisters placed in rented stretch limos, and his projected targets were sites in the UK and US. In America, he had planned attacks against the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in Washington, the New York Stock Exchange and Citigroup buildings in New York, and the Prudential building in Newark. In April 2001, Barot had traveled with associates Qaisar Shaffi and Nadeem Tarmohamed to the United States to perform reconnaissance of the sites he intended to attack.

Barot knew Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who planned the 9/11 attacks, and on a video taken by Barot of the World Trade Center, he chillingly turned the camera on its side and made the sound of an explosion. Barot kept most of the details of his plans on the hard drive of his computer, with some kept at the homes of trusted members of his cell. In addition to plotting attack scenarios involving explosives, Barot had also amassed details of a plot to carry out a "dirty bomb" attack. Though heavily censored by the Metropolitan Police, Barot's feasibility study can be found here (pdf format).

The substances which Barot examined were americium-241, californium-252, cesium-137, cobalt-60 and strontium-90. He additionally examined tritium, which is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, which exists as a gas and thus would be more difficult to incorporate into an RDD. Barot noted that tritium would "rise into the sky once released". He liked cesium-137 as it is "both powerful and widely available". It would also chemically bond with building materials, making cleanup difficult.

He wrote: "When constructing an RDD (radioactive dispersal device a.k.a. Dirty Bomb) you face constraints arising from the radioactivity of the source. To cause a large amount of radioactive contamination, we would be drawn toward very high activity sources. However, in order to prepare the source for effective dispersal by removing the shielding, we would risk exposing ourselves to lethal doses. Even in suicidal missions, we might not live long enough to deliver a very highly radioactive RDD that uses gamma-emitting sources and is not shielded. If we tried to protect ourselves by shielding the source, the weight of the RDD could significantly increase thereby increasing the difficulty of delivering the device and causing successful dispersion of the radioactive material."

Barot quoted Dr Steven E. Koonin a nuclear physicist who was provost at California Institute of Technology until 2004: "If just three curies (a fraction of a gram) of an appropriate isotope was spread over a square mile, the area would become uninhabitable according to the recommended exposure limits protecting the general population. While the direct health effect would be minimal (for each 100,000 people exposed, some 4 cancer deaths would would be added to the 20,000 lifetime cancers that would have occurred otherwise) the psychological effects would be enormous."

Barot was also aware of the economic effects of an RDD attack. He wrote that such an attack would "create panic and potentially large economic consequences... long-term increases in cancer incidence, long-term denial of property use, disruption of services, and property and facility decontamination needs." He mused: A few grams of cobalt-60 with several pounds of explosives are enough to close an area the size of Manhattan. Unfortunately the carrier will be one of the many victims once the device has been detonated." Barot's isotope of choice was americium-241, derived from plutonium, which "meets the criteria I have set". It is easily available in smoke detectors in minute amounts, and as it emits alpha particles Barot claimed it would be "harmless" for the user. As it decays, americium-241 does emit gamma rays at an energy level higher than radium-226 (the radionuclide suggested on the "Al-Firdaws" Al Qaeda website), but less than cesium-137 and considerably less than cobalt-60.

Contemplating The Unthinkable

Detonation of a nuclear fissile device is a "worst-case scenario". As outlined in Part One, the most likely form of terrorist fissile device would be a "gun barrel" bomb, containing between 12 and 25 grams of extremely pure uranium-235, with a yield of between 10 and 20 kilotons. To gain a perspective of how much of an area would be affected by such a device, detonated at ground level, the Federation of American Scientists have produced a "bomb-a-city" calculator.

The huge amounts of casualties and panic a fissile device would cause would also be followed by massive economic costs of cleanup. Winds could spread the fallout over a wide area. The cleanup costs following either a fissile or an RDD device could be astronomical.

So how prepared are the authorities for the scenarios of fissile or RDD attack? On April 15, 2005 the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office was created to "improve the Nation's capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material". It is obvious that the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is now involving numerous agencies within America to be prepared for such events. However, even though increased awareness, coordinated strategies and good intelligence are essential for combatting radiological attack, the nightmare scenario of such an attack happening would still be catastrophic.

In January this year, Homeland Security chief Michael Chertoff warned: "You can't put that genie back in the bottle once a weapon of mass destruction or a nuclear bomb gets into the hands of a terrorist."

In 2003, ABT Associates produced a report which stated that a 10-20 kiloton nuclear bomb, smuggled into a US port via a container, could create between 50,000 and 1 million deaths depending on the population and size of the city. The economic loss from property damage, trade disruption, and indirect costs would come, in the first year to an amount from hundreds of billions to trillions of dollars. The economic cost of lives lost would be from $150 billion to $3 trillion (30% of US GDP).

In 2006 the Rand Corporation produced a report entitled "Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack", which envisaged a container carrying a 10 kiloton nuclear bomb being detonated at ground level at a pier at the Port of Long Beach, Los Angeles. 60,000 could die in the blast, with 150,000 exposed to hazardous levels of radiation. 6 million people would try to flee, and 2-3 million people lying in fallout zones would need rehousing. Costs would be $300 billion for homes lost, $20 billion in lives lost, $350,000 in insurance, $80 billion worker's compensation, etc. The total cost would be 1 trillion dollars.

The Belfer Center at Harvard University produced in May this year a 25-page report entitled "The Day After: Action in the 24 Hours Following a Nuclear Blast in an American City". The scenario discussed involved a 10 kiloton fissile device being detonated at ground level. The report includes the gloomy statement: "The federal government should stop pretending that state and local officials will be able to control the situation on the Day After," and suggests that in the manner of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, most cities and states would be "overwhelmed" by the scale of the challenge. They also warn of potential "follow-up" attacks either in the same city or in other centers of administration/population.

The authors suggest a return of "fallout shelters", which had been abandoned by civic defense strategists in the era of the Soviet nuclear threat. At that time, faced with the threat of multiple nuclear warheads, these shelters had fallen out of favor, but now they could be vital in saving lives in the immediate aftermath of an attack. They also suggest that emergency service providers and citizens within the affected area would have to accept living with long-term radiation levels higher than currently recommended.

Figures above, on the economic damage from a nuclear blast, could be conservative estimates. In 2005, Barbara A. Reichmuth with researchers from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory produced a report for the DHS, entitled "Economic Consequences of a Radiological/Nuclear Attack: Cleanup Standards Significantly Affect Cost." There comes a point when practical economics has to make a trade-off with decontamination standards. In the event of a 13-kiloton bomb on New York City, the costs of cleanup and other costs could come close to the entire US GDP in one year. Reichmuth said: "That's not just government expenditures, that's the entire output of the U.S. economy, every factory, store and business, for a full year."

The costs of decontaminating NYC after a 13-kiloton blast could be $1 trillion if a 5 rem per year standard was followed, and four times as much if a more stringent standard of 15 millirem/y was the objective. Reichmuth said: "At some point it may become so cost prohibitive to cleanup, given current technologies, that you may decide to sacrifice an area, i.e., not clean it up."

The variability in how far cleanup operations are taken applies also to the scenario of an RDD attack. On January 3, 2006, the Department for Homeland Security published its Dirty Bomb Cleanup Guidance. The guidance set practical standards of contamination cleanup that were not within the recommended "safe" doses of radiation exposure which are usually enjoyed by US citizens. For this, groups such as NIRS were critical. They claimed that the DHS Federal Emergency Management would allow people to return to areas with unsafe radiation levels (10,000 millirems a year) which "would cause cancer in 1/4 to 1/3 of the people exposed."

Donald Tighe, a spokesman for the White House Office of Science and Technology said that no numerical standard on cleanup was provided because of the variability of contaminant scenarios. He said: "This is the feedback we've gotten from state and local officials. (They want) a flexible approach." The standard of 10,000 millirems a year is claimed by the London-based International Commission on Radiation Protection to be an acceptable exposure level.

In June 2005 a DHS report highlighted the shortfalls of medical assessments in the event of an "emergency radiation dose" scenario, which would include the immediate aftermath of an RDD attack. This stated: "Presently available methods are not satisfactory for managing the medical casualties from an R/N event and there is urgent need to develop new capabilities to assess radiation dose quickly with at least moderate precision. Assessment of emesis is only a rough indicator of acute exposure and can never be relied upon alone, especially for quantitative information... there is an urgent need to develop novel emerging technologies to supplement the current capabilities for assessing emergency radiation doses."

There are potential treatments for radiation poisoning such as potassium iodide (No-Rad). Injections of pentetate calcium trisodium or pentetate zinc trisodium (Ca-DPTA or Zn-DPTA) can be administered in the event of ingestion of americium-241. These bind to the radionuclide, as well as to plutonium, and are excreted in the urine. The FDA has said that these drugs are "stored in sufficient quantity to provide treatment if there is an emergency." Other radionuclides require other treatments.

Despite such treatments being available to ameliorate the effects of radionuclide ingestion, they would need to be administered as soon as possible after an attack. In the case of an RDD attack, the panic following the conventional explosion which accompanies radiological dispersion could delay both the analysis of the component isotope, and consequently delay patient diagnosis and treatment.

The consequences of a nuclear or RDD attack are horrendous. Yet all people should be aware that Islamist terrorists are actively intending to commit these acts. The only ways that citizens can protect themselves against such scenarios are to remain forever vigilant, to report radicals to the authorities, and to support all government measures to strengthen intelligence and prevention.

Adrian Morgan

© 2003-2007 FamilySecurityMatters.org All Rights Reserved

Posted by Giraldus Cambrensis at June 20, 2007 10:27 AM

Comments

Posted by: Sir Henry Morgan at June 21, 2007 5:27 AM

Posted by: Giraldus Cambrensis at June 21, 2007 9:05 AM

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