Western Resistance

2309 The strict conditions for legitimate defense by military force require rigorous consideration. The gravity of such a decision makes it subject to rigorous conditions of moral legitimacy. At one and the same time:

- the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain;

- all other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective;

- there must be serious prospects of success;

- the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. The power of modem means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition.

The evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good.

I have criticisms for each clause of the Just War Doctrine:

"The damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain."

Taken at its word, this means that lasting but slight damage should not be met by force of arms. This means that in the 1982 Falklands War, the United Kingdom had not right to take the Falklands by force. General Galtieri should have been allowed his triumph. The UK should have taken the punch, and rolled over gracefully. Adherence to this principle, thus, would encourage small-scale military adventurism. (For a more recent example, Spain was "wrong" in re-taking Perejil Island from Morocco because the damage done to Spain was not grave.)

Similarly, grave dangers that are not certain are not given the status of casus belli. Israel was severely criticized for its pre-emptive strike against the Egyptian and Syrian armies in the 1967 war. A plain reading of the JWD sustains this criticism, because it wasn't certain Egypt and Syria were going to attack Israel. This example alone should prompt reflection in those who accept the JWD unconditionally.

Furthermore, this clause de-legitimizes military response to ethnic conflict, including genocide. In 1969, El Salvador and Honduras fought in what came to be known as "the Soccer War". The war was caused by the Honduran Government's decision to expel Salvadorian squatters from the lands they were cultivating, while taking no action against Honduran squatters. As usually happens in these unpleasant events, the anti-squatter campaign promptly became a murder, rape, and pillaging campaign, with defenseless Salvadorian civilians providing the corpses. After emotions came to a boil following two hard-fought soccer games, the Salvadorian Army invaded Honduras, swiftly taking the border area, where most of its civilians lived. The Organization of American States, following international law influenced by the JWD, condemned El Salvador as the aggressor.

"All other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective."

This is perhaps the most widely known, and the most broadly accepted clause of the JWD. It has even become a political slogan; "war should be the last resort". But I say; war should be one of many responses available from the start. If it is known a nation will use war as a last resort, it gives enormous incentive to an aggressor to move ahead with its plans, while giving false hope to the aggrieved party. Witness Yasser Arafat's murderous campaign against Israel: he would kill Jews and keep on killing them, only to promise that peace was just around the corner. Amazingly, he was able to fool most of the International Community, and a significant part of the Israeli people into believing he was a Peace Partner. For a different example, notice Iran's strategy for developing nuclear weapons: they cheat on their agreements, then give the United Nations hope they will stop their cheating ways, at which point no action is taking to stop them. Then they cheat again, make other empty promises (thus seeming to provide 'other means' to solve the dispute), and the Uranium enrichment goes on.

"There must be serious prospects of success."

If you accept this clause, the following defensive wars and desperate struggles, among many others, were all immoral: Poland resisting Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939, the Warsaw uprising in 1944, the Tibetan war against Chinese aggression in 1951, and the Kuwaiti Army's fight against Iraq in 1990. There was no serious prospect of success in any of those cases. What the JWD defenders fails to see is that following this advice would encourage more aggression, by making it cheaper. Furthermore, declaring you won't fight when overmatched would draw hungry aggressors toward you like flies are drawn toward over-ripe mango slices. That is why honor "we will fight you, even if it is hopeless" is not an old-fashioned value, but a value crucial to the survival of a nation. If you are not willing to fight, what you have will be taken from you.

"The use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. The power of modem means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition."

Although this sounds reasonable on first reading, it ignores the logic of deterrence. Specifically, it goes against the cold war doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, the poetically-named MAD. But however we might wish that there is a way out of the MAD trap, its logic is impeccable: if you refuse to use overwhelming force against nuclear aggression, the only thing you might you are doing is encouraging such aggression! A ruthless enemy would be able to obtain enormous concessions from you by using blackmail. (Just like North Korea has been able to do.)

General Criticism & Conclusion:

I also have a general criticism which goes beyond each individual clause: the doctrine assumes a human nature that only things in the overactive minds of moral philosophers. According to the Doctrine, honor is unimportant, aggressors can usually be made to negotiate (or is it to see the error of their ways?). Defeat, nay, cultural annihilation, is preferable to war. I could not disagree more if I tried. I leave it up to you, dear reader, to make up your own mind.